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What Is “Good” Education Research?
Karl Hostetler

Abstract
The question of what counts as good
education research has received a
great deal of attention, but too often it
is conceived principally as a methodological question rather than an ethical one. Good education research is
a matter not only of sound procedures
but also of beneficial aims and results;
our ultimate aim as researchers and
educators is to serve people’s well-being. For their research to be deemed
good in a strong sense, education researchers must be able to articulate
some sound connection between their
work and a robust and justifiable conception of human well-being. There
is a good deal of history and convention against such a conception of researchers’ work. We need to consider
the conditions needed if that conception is to be realized. Among the conditions is a concerted and cooperative
endeavor for moral education among
researchers and the people with whom
they work—a context where questions
of wellbeing are foregrounded, welcomed, and vigorously debated.

T

he question of what counts as
good education research has
been debated for a long time and
still concerns researchers. The question can be posed at a philosophical
level, as in the debate about the epistemological merits of quantitative as opposed to qualitative research, and at a
more particular level, where the issue
is the quality of a particular research
project. Recently, the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) has intruded the
U.S. federal government into the matter with its de facto definition of good
research as consisting of experimental
studies that yield prescriptions for ac-

tion. This definition provides special
political and professional urgency (at
least for the near future) to the need
for education researchers to ponder
and speak out on the question of what
constitutes good research.
However, I do not dwell on NCLB
here. It is but a recent manifestation of
how the question of good research can
be framed too narrowly, a frame that
I fear education researchers sometimes
fall into. This narrowness can come
from confining questions of “good” essentially to the methodological realm:
“Good” research has an appropriate
number of subjects to survey or interview, yields reproducible results or
provides for independent review of
qualitative data, and so on. One can
criticize NCLB because good research
need not be experimental; but such a
response, while legitimate, keeps debate at the methodological level. What
is sacrificed is adequate attention to
the question of what good comes from
educational policies and practices,
how they do or do not contribute to
the well-being of students, teachers,
and communities.
However, the problem of narrowness is not limited to researchers who
are fixated on methodology. Researchers genuinely concerned for well-being can be too narrow if they do not
appreciate the complexity of well-being and its pursuit (Hostetler, 1995).
In this essay I propose that good research requires our careful, ongoing
attention to questions of human wellbeing, and I urge education researchers to think about how to achieve the
conditions under which that attention
can flourish.
Perhaps a couple warnings are in
order before I begin to make my case.
First, clearly I am not sanguine about
the state of education research. I readily grant that some number of my misgivings are based more on my personal experiences than on a thorough
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study of the state of education research. I have read enough and talked
enough to colleagues around the country to be confident that I am not totally off-base. Yet my principal aim
is to provoke thought and conversation about our work as education researchers, not to analyze our research
community. If it turns out that my experiences are unique or that I am delusional, so much the better.
Second, my approach is rather irreverent in places. I think that serious
issues cannot be dealt with seriously
unless we are willing to be playful
with them. I apologize in advance if
I offend some readers. But, in my defense, I appeal to Benjamin Barber
(1992), who argues that all good teaching is offensive, and to Maxine Greene,
whom I heard say that the point of
philosophy is to “keep the pain alive.”
So look at this essay as an experiment
on whether being annoying is just
what a good teacher and philosopher
ought to do.
What’s the Problem?
Over the past decade or so, in the
pages of Educational Researcher and
elsewhere, we have seen the question
of good education research explored in
terms of quantitative and qualitative
methodologies. These debates have
been valuable for helping us to think
about the nature and aims of education
research. They have raised important
ethical questions about how researchers should understand and work with
the human beings they study. The danger is that the debate can be limited to
methodology. It would be like debating how we should research the effectiveness of thumbscrews as a means
of torture. A quantitative researcher
might say we need a random sample
of subjects and some quantifiable measure of results, say the pitch and duration of victims’ shrieks. A qualitative
researcher could retort that such data
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are inadequate, and might want to interview the victims to get a thicker and
richer narrative of their experience and
its meaning for them. Of course, we
might realize that we do not have an
either–or choice here. We say that both
approaches, or some “multimethods”
approach, can provide useful data to
theorists and practitioners of torture.
The point of my admittedly naughty
example is not to disparage quantitative and qualitative methodologies or
methodological debates. However, I
do disparage blindness to, or lack of interest in, the question of how research
serves people’s well-being. Good research is a matter not only of sound
procedures but also of beneficial aims
and results. Our ultimate aim as researchers and practitioners is to serve
people’s wellbeing— the well-being of
students, teachers, communities, and
others. Education research can have a
profound impact on people’s well-being. A cynic might reply, “Well, then,
thank goodness no one pays attention to education research.” Of course,
whatever the truth of that, it does not
let us off the ethical hook. And in addition to obligations to others, researchers have an ethical obligation to themselves. Call it an issue of integrity or
identity. Education researchers have a
right and an obligation to understand
what they are doing, to stand for something worthwhile that gives their personal and professional lives meaning,
and to articulate that thing to themselves and others.
Readers might chafe at my suggestion that researchers are blind to issues
of wellbeing. I certainly do not suggest that questions of human well-being have not been addressed, and addressed well, in education research. I
do question, though, whether concern
for those questions is as ubiquitous
and serious as it needs to be.
For example, many people vigorously promote good-sounding slogans
such as “All children can learn” and
“Leave no child behind.” Yes, all children can learn, but as Noddings (1992)
points out, what the sloganeers often
ignore is the question, “Learn what?”
The assumption tends to be that the
“what” is some form of liberal education, but Noddings argues against a liberal education, at least as it is construed
traditionally. And about leaving no
child behind, if we are herding the lemmings toward the cliff, I am not sure
we do the laggards a favor by making
sure they keep up with the pack. Good-

sounding slogans are no substitute for
genuine ethical understanding of the
ends we are trying to achieve.
Good intentions do not guarantee good research. However, my argument does not hinge on the existence of bad research. Researchers may
well be able to make a sound case for
the ethical value of their research; but
my argument is that they do need to
be able to make that case. And that is
where my doubts lie. Researchers are
expected to be knowledgeable and articulate regarding the processes of research. I am not sure there are similar expectations regarding the ethical
ends of research—expectations that researchers be knowledgeable and articulate regarding human well-being.
I propose that, if their research to
be deemed good in the fullest sense,
education researchers must be able to
make sound and articulatable, if not
fully articulated, connections to a robust and justifiable conception of human well-being. I choose my words
carefully. Stating the proposal this
way allows for stronger and weaker
senses of good research. I think we
have to acknowledge that research can
be good in the relevant sense without
the researcher’s really understanding
that it is good. But that is a weak sense
of good research. I urge that we work
toward a stronger sense of good research, requiring researchers not only
to serve well-being but also to understand how they are serving it (or not).
So, what is there to understand?
“Wellbeing” itself is a difficult concept. Philosophers debate whether it
is essentially a state of mind, a state of
affairs, or a melding of both. Is a student doing well if she thinks she is
succeeding in math even if she is not?
Is she doing well if she is succeeding
but gets no pleasure from it or affirmation? If state of mind is important, then
what state of mind is important? Pleasure? Satisfaction? Pride? Is success an
important state of affairs? What does
“success” mean? The complexity of the
concept does not preclude our making
legitimate judgments about a person’s
well-being (Griffin, 1986), but it should
keep us from being complacent about
our understanding of well-being and
the goods that contribute to it.
At the same time, how far must we
go with skepticism? Thumbscrews are
one thing, but must we really take seriously the idea that educational aims
such as teaching math or reading or
character, or assessing students’ learn-
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ing, or preparing preschoolers for
school, or promoting young people’s
health, need to be questioned for their
contributions to wellbeing? Yes, we really must take that idea seriously, and
for two basic reasons: the complexity
of goods, and the complexity of a good
human life.
The Complexity of Goods
One reason that educational aims
must be researched is that the concepts
we use to articulate educational aims
typically are contestable. What does
it mean “to read” or “to learn” or “to
prepare”?
Consider the notion of character. One of the more popular character education programs is “Character
Counts.” This program posits six “pillars” of character: trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring,
and citizenship. Deborah Meier (1995)
offers a rather different view. For her
it is essential that students learn to be
observant, playful, skeptical, imaginative, respectful of evidence, able
to communicate, caring, and possess
a good work ethic (p. 170). There is
overlap between the two perspectives.
Both mention caring, for example, and
Meier clearly ties her traits to the demands of citizenship. However, there
are various ways to manifest care and
citizenship, and, although I will not
fully argue the point here, I suggest
that Meier’s conception is rather different from what is emphasized in “Character Counts.” We at least get a suggestion of that if we focus on items in
Meier’s list such as skepticism, regard
for evidence, and playfulness. Imagine a school that encouraged students
to be skeptical about school rules or a
teacher’s ideas, to play around with
alternatives, to demand evidence for
why things should be as they are. Perhaps Meier’s virtues are consistent
with “Character Counts” “pillars,” but
it is significant that they are made explicit and placed at the forefront.
John Dewey (1909) offers a still different view. Virtues that he considers
essential are force of character, judgment, and responsiveness. Students
need to be willing and able to stand for
something, while using good judgment
about when and how to do so and being willing and able to activate their
“force” and judgment because they
are sensitive to the people and events
about them that call for a response.
What I note here is that Dewey does
not see character as a matter of some-
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how “possessing” traits such as “respect” or “care”; for Dewey, virtue is
shown in action, and situations and the
actions that they call for typically are
complex. Simple prescriptions about
being respectful or caring or whatever
just do not get us very far. Again, if we
imagine a school where students are
encouraged to respond to their whole
surroundings, to take stands (perhaps
against adults), and to exercise their
own judgment, I think we get a very
different picture of character.
My concern here is not to defend
or attack any particular conception
of character. My point is that even an
“obvious” good such as character merits careful scrutiny. At stake are quite
different conceptions of that part of a
good human life.
The Complexity of a Good Life
A second reason for taking the question of good seriously is that, even if
some educational aim is found to be
good, it constitutes only one good. But
human well-being is complex. Rarely
do good things come without some sort
of cost or tradeoff. Academic achievement, whatever that is, may be good,
but at what cost? Is it really worth the
cost of cutting art, music, recess, and
other supposed “extras”? I am pretty
sure that Meier and Dewey would say
no. People tend to just assume that “the
basics” are reading, writing, and arithmetic. Plato, however, argued that
gymnastics and music are basic, stressing the fundamental value of movement and harmony of the body and
soul. Granted, that was some 2,500
years ago, but I have to think that we
might benefit from greater concern for
soul even nowadays.
Or how about reducing school violence? That is a good thing, we cannot deny. But again, at what cost?
Proponents of character education
sometimes try to justify their programs
by offering data that incidents of violence decline in schools that have such
programs. What they tend not to look
at are other attendant outcomes. Are
students also discouraged from exercising force of character and judgment,
the principal if implicit virtue stressed
being mere obedience? It is far from
obvious that having a safe school is inconsistent with Deweyan virtues, as
the example of Meier’s school shows.
Following
Martha
Nussbaum
(1990), what these issues demand of
researchers is “vision” that they be
“finely aware and richly responsible”:
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We live amid bewildering complexities. Obtuseness and refusal of vision are our besetting vices. Responsible lucidity
can be wrested from that darkness only by painful, vigilant effort, the intense scrutiny of particulars. Our highest and hardest
task is to make ourselves people
on whom nothing is lost. (p. 148)
The questions that researchers must
face are difficult. I do not propose that
the correct answers will become obvious if only we look hard enough. We
should not always expect, or even desire, unity of judgment. What we can
and should expect, however, is unity
in the belief that we as researchers
have an obligation to ask these questions of ourselves and others, and to
see that they are being answered well.
(Re)Conceptualizing Researchers’
Work
This orientation implies a particular
conception of an education researcher’s work, which I begin to articulate
by contrasting it with some recent suggestions by Labaree (2003) regarding
how a researcher’s work differs from
a teacher’s work. (My disagreements
with Labaree may be more semantic
than substantive, but I believe the issues are important nonetheless.) Labaree proposes several shifts that teachers must undergo in their transition to
researcher. I will consider two: from
the normative to the analytical, and
from the particular to the universal.
Labaree is clear that researchers
have, or can have, moral concerns. Still,
he describes the transition from teacher
to researcher as involving a shift from
the normative to the analytical. I agree
that some such shift may be appropriate. For example, I can see the point
that, “[p]osed with a situation in which
two children are fighting in the back
of the classroom, the scholar wants to
ponder the social, psychological, economic, and pedagogical reasons for this
conflict, while the teacher wants to separate the combatants” (Labaree, p. 18).
(However, I also think the separation of
roles should not be overdrawn. Teachers can and should analyze classroom
situations, and I hope that researchers would be ready to step in to stop a
fight.) However, I would describe the
shift as one within rather than away from
the normative realm. The shift may be
from more immediate, less explicitly
analytical normative concerns to less
immediate, more explicitly analytical
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concerns—but this is a shift in the way
that the normative is served. The ultimate concern still is, or should be, normative. What if we can explain a classroom fight in terms of some sort of
socioeconomic class conflict; a poor kid
resents a rich kid. But what does that
really explain? Why should class differences generate resentment? Something
vital is left out if we cannot embed the
analysis within a realm of normative
factors, such as a human being’s desire
for dignity and a fair chance at a good
life. Analysis may be inspired by moral
concerns, and it may be used to serve
moral concerns, but even more than
that, it is itself a moral activity, a form of
practical philosophy (Carr, 2003). Inevitably, education research has moral implications. The choice for researchers is
whether they will give voice to those
implications or remain silent about
them.
I have similar concerns about Labaree’s shift from particular to universal, which I need to address, given my
belief about the importance of “intense
scrutiny of particulars.” Again, there
may be some point in such a shift.
Rightly, researchers are concerned
about developing generalizations and
theories. Indeed, inquiry into human
well-being can and does lead to generalizations about what a good human life entails (as in Nussbaum, 2000)
and can therefore help us to understand what may be good for any particular person. But here, too, I am uneasy about speaking in terms of a shift
away from the particular instead of a
shift to a different way of serving the
particular. Perhaps the danger is most
obvious in research using randomized
populations.
The basic idea there is to make irrelevant the influence of at least some
particulars that might distinguish people one from another. That can have
some virtue, but it can also have the
vice of suppressing just those particular factors and experiences that
are essential to individuals’ well-being. Imagine research that establishes
a strong positive correlation between
some teaching approach and students’
success in reading (however that might
be defined), irrespective of students’
particular backgrounds. That can be
valuable information; yet something
is missing if the research is silent on
what happens to particular students.
We find a way to improve students’
reading. Okay, but was it worth it?
What were the costs, the tradeoffs?
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Did some kids enjoy the curriculum
and the instruction? Were some miserable? Resistant? If the emerging theory
is not somehow addressing, or at the
very least acknowledging, the complexity of ethically relevant particulars
that affect the well-being of particular
persons, the moral task is incomplete.
I am well aware that adopting such
a conception of researchers’ work might
necessitate some dramatic changes regarding how research is done, how student researchers are educated, how different sorts of research are rewarded,
and so on. For example, when researchers are attuned to particulars, clearly
the scope and complexity of their research expand. A higher-education culture that values quantity of publications might not be especially hospitable
to such research. The conception of research attuned to particulars also suggests how vital it can be for researchers to have partners, such as teachers in
classrooms, who can offer insights into
particulars because of their intimate involvement with students, parents, and
others—an intimacy that is difficult for
researchers to achieve.
To move toward my proposed conception of good research, we would
need to address attitudes and concerns
that challenge it. In the space allotted
here, I cannot offer anything close to
an adequate discussion of the implications of this conception; however, I
will venture to note some of the basic
issues involved and some basic conditions needed for its realization.
Conditions for Research Into
Human Well-Being
Can the Good Be “Researched”?
One issue to face is a history of education research during which questions
of value have been marginalized. Lagemann (2000) describes how, early in the
twentieth century, the desire to make
the study of education more “scientific” led to a separation of reason from
value and so put value questions out
of bounds. Academic philosophy no
doubt abetted that move with logical
empiricists’ conceptions of science and
knowledge. Also, in philosophy, interest in well-being waned, perhaps because of its connection to utilitarianism,
which was falling out of favor. However, these trends have been reversed
in recent decades. Philosophy of science
has debunked the putative separation
of reason and value. Human well-being again has become an issue for phil-

osophic inquiry (Griffin, 1986; Hurka,
1993; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993; Raz, 1986;
Sher, 1997; Sumner, 1996; Taylor, 1989;
Warner, 1987; White, 1991).
Nonetheless, the reason–value separation persists. For example, a danger
I see in Labaree’s shift from the normative to the analytical is that it seems
to suggest a separation between value
and reason, even if implicitly and
unintentionally.
I have had students and colleagues
state that inquiry into the good (and
other philosophical issues) does not
merit the status of “research,” because these issues are just “a matter of
opinion” or merely “subjective.” Often, these claims rest on the existence
of ethical controversies and disagreements. But the mere fact of disagreement does not entail the conclusion
reached. For one thing, if disagreement in some area showed that only
“opinions” were involved, then science, which is full of disagreements,
would be a matter of opinion, too; but
usually science is taken as the paradigm of objectivity.
In addition, we should not exaggerate the extent of disagreement about
ethical issues. In the classes I teach, I
prefer that students talk. Sometimes
they are reluctant to do so. Usually,
I do not resort to sticking them with
cattle prods. I imagine most people
would agree that this is a good policy.
Now, the reply might be that science nevertheless is different because
it is based on facts and experiment. In
language that is popular these days,
one might ask, What is my “research
base” to support not sticking students
with cattle prods?
If the demand is for data that
show an experimental group of students stuck with cattle prods talked
no more than students in the control
group, then I have no such data. My
reply is that I need no such data and,
in fact, would be pretty screwed up if
I thought I did. To engage in ethical
thought and action at all, one has to
accept certain baseline commitments,
such as respecting the dignity and humanity of persons.
Does that make ethics arbitrary or
merely subjective? Hardly. But if we
insisted that ethics was arbitrary because of that, we would have to conclude the same thing about science.
One cannot do science without certain
basic commitments such as respect for
evidence and the value of simplicity
and consistency in explanations.
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And if science has facts such as “the
earth is spherical (roughly) and billions of years old,” so does ethics—
facts such as “it is wrong to cause gratuitous pain” and “all people deserve
a fair chance at a good life.” Of course,
there might be people who deny those
last two propositions. But then there
are people who deny that the earth is
spherical and ancient. In the latter case,
we do not conclude, therefore, that the
shape and age of the earth is all a matter of opinion; similarly in ethics.
Also, if science has its experiments,
so does ethics. Life is the laboratory
for ethics. History and contemporary
life offer a rich account of struggles,
of successes and failures, of “experiments,” in which human beings have
sought to live lives that are worthwhile. Empirical evidence surely is relevant to research into well-being. For
example, in her research with women
in India, Nussbaum (2000) found that
the women aspired to many of the
same things that people everywhere
aspire to, things like the integrity of
their bodies, health, and self-respect.
Such findings are important for our
understanding of human well-being.
However, even though empirical
findings are relevant to ethical questions, to engage with questions about
well-being we must be clear about
the necessity to go beyond the empirical. In other words, good education research requires philosophy, in
particular moral theory. As the point
sometimes is stated, “‘Is’ does not imply ‘ought.’” Facts about the way the
world is cannot tell us what we ought
to do. If students responded well to
cattle prods, it would not follow that
they ought to be shocked. If children
can learn the alphabet before entering school, it does not follow that they
should. If abstinence-only sex education programs were shown to reduce
the teenage pregnancy rate more than
other programs, that alone would not
determine that those are the programs
we should use. To each of those scenarios, we can and must say, “Okay,
but how does that serve people’s wellbeing?” And to answer that question, we have to venture wide-eyed
and strenuously into the “bewildering
complexities” of human good.
Freedom
Many people get nervous when
venturing into ethics, believing that
decisions in that domain should be left
to individuals. If we start raising ques-

20
tions about what is good, visions of
Puritans might start dancing in their
heads. For instance, in response to the
examples just noted, one might object:
“But what if parents want their child to
learn the alphabet in preschool or want
an abstinence-only program?” Or,
“What if faculty colleagues want to do
such-and-such research? Who are we
to say they shouldn’t?”
These are important questions. We
need to be clear that having moral concern does not mean being moralistic
and sanctimonious. Freedom is an important ethical and academic good and
should not be infringed cavalierly. Often, maybe usually, we will not want
to thwart people’s aims, even if we
think them mistaken. Still, freedom is
not an absolute good. Its value, like
that of other goods, has to be judged in
relation to its contribution to well-being. Our lives are full of legitimate instances where our freedom is limited
for the sake of others’ well-being and
our own. And even if the goal should
not be to thwart someone’s projects,
we, as researchers and educators, have
the right and indeed the obligation to
raise questions when we see possible
threats to well-being.
Of course, I have found that merely
raising questions is too much for some
people. In higher education and elsewhere, my experience is that questions often tend not to be welcomed,
to put it mildly. It seems that to some
people being questioned shows arrogance and/or lack of trust on the part
of questioners. To some people, questioners are malcontents unwilling to be
team players. But if that is the case, I
would have to ask which is more arrogant: thinking there are complexities
that need to be addressed, or thinking that one has all the right answers,
trusting in oneself so much as to be
immune to second thoughts? Who is
a team player: someone who figures
everyone should do whatever they
feel like, or someone who tries to engage with others in a common struggle
to do what is best for the people they
serve? And who is discontented if that
project falls short?
The Need for Moral Education
What mechanisms are needed for
the requisite questioning to occur? It
could be pointed out that already there
are mechanisms in place, notably institutional review boards (IRBs), which
guard against harmful research. IRBs
are indeed important, but preventing
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harmful research is not the same as promoting good research; good research is
not the same as nonharmful research.
In addition, IRBs are concerned with
the more obvious physical and emotional harm that research subjects may
suffer. However, what counts as an important harm or good may not be obvious and may even be contentious. I
do not propose that IRBs become arbiters of these debates. Issues of well-being are too complex—and too important—to be handed over to a small,
select panel. What is needed is a concerted and cooperative endeavor for
moral education among researchers, in
collaboration with those with whom
they work.
This brings me to another objection that I sometimes hear from colleagues around the country or around
the cooler. It goes something like this:
“If people are bad, talking at them or
having them take courses or having
them read books is not going to reform
them.” The observation is true, but it is
a red herring. I return to Nussbaum’s
vision metaphor. The presumption is
not that people err with regard to wellbeing because they are evil. We err because we overlook something, misperceive something. All of us have blind
spots. But we can improve our vision.
And observing, arguing, reading, and
thinking certainly have a role in helping us achieve that.
At the same time, “refusal of vision” certainly is possible. I myself
have been around long enough to despair of ever persuading some people
to open their eyes. What we as a community of researchers can do, though,
is begin to expect that from researchers. In our own institutions, with our
students and faculty colleagues, we
can begin to foreground issues of the
good and hold people accountable to
them. We can engage in serious conversation about well-being.

history, sociology, anthropology, religious studies, and other disciplines.
And (and maybe I should not put this
in print) philosophy, at least some sorts
of philosophy, may not always be helpful for questions of well-being. That is
why Nussbaum (1990), philosophical
as she is, so often uses novels to explore
human life. For education researchers who have not seen them, I would
also recommend “The Simpsons” and
“South Park” for explorations of philosophy and human life.
The point is, somewhere along the
line researchers need to gain adequate
awareness of, concern for, and understanding of issues of well-being.
Even if their research is not immediately concerned with wellbeing, they
need to understand how it is related to
well-being.

Diversity and Community
This communal inquiry needs a diversity of perspectives. Pursuit of wellbeing is a broad enough and complex
enough challenge that all sorts of research have a place in it. As much as I
urge researchers to be attentive to questions of well-being, I do not say that all
researchers should always make those
questions their immediate concern.
And as much as I have stressed philosophy, I am not saying that everyone has
to read and know “philosophy.” Questions of human good are confronted in

Knowing We Don’t Know
Frankly, I wonder how many education researchers have that sort of
understanding. I hasten to add that I
am not condemning them for that; as
I have noted, the culture of education
research, at least in the past hundred
years or so, has not emphasized such
understanding. For example, when
doctoral students are told to write literature reviews for their dissertations,
I suspect that, often, they are not directed to the sort of literature I am
talking about. But that in itself is a relatively minor problem.
I turn to the German philosopher
Hans-Georg Gadamer to suggest
what is really essential. Gadamer
(1960/1989) writes:
Knowledge always means, precisely,
considering opposites. Its superiority over preconceived opinion consists in the fact that it is able to conceive of possibilities as possibilities. .
. . [So] only a person who has questions can have knowledge. [However,] there is no such thing as a
method of learning to ask questions,
of learning to see what is questionable. On the contrary, the example of
Socrates teaches that the important
thing is the knowledge that one does
not know. (p. 365)

I draw your attention to three elements of this passage. The first is the
role of questions. As I have tried to
show, the quest for well-being continually presents us with questions, with
possibilities and opposites to consider.
Even if we can get past the question of
what is good, we must ask whether the
good thing is good for these people, at
this time, in this situation.
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The second element regards “conditions.” There is no method for learning to ask questions. Reading stuff
might help, but not if it is used only
to warehouse information. Conditions
have to be such that reading and other
activities lead to awareness of an expanding horizon of unexplored territory, of ethical questions to be asked.
There may be a number of conditions needed for good research, but
the third element I note is Gadamer’s (1960/1989) essential condition:
knowledge that one does not know. If
we consider the state of education research, does it include knowledge that
we do not know? We cannot look into
people’s heads, but let us think about
the conditions that education researchers find themselves in and ask whether
knowing that one does not know is the
sort of knowledge that is valued and
encouraged.
Of course, in some sense, all research starts with a question, awareness
that one does not know something. The
problem is that research tends to end
with an answer. Hello? Of course, I am
not saying researchers should not try to
answer questions. The problem is ending with answers—being unaware of
or uninterested in the ethical questions
generated or avoided. The “answers”
to research questions do not end things
but offer new circumstances for exploring the persistent question of what is
good for people.
Unfortunately, these days many
people tend to want to end with answers. Given the state of U.S. education, with the attendant pressure to
produce “results,” one can understand
why people look for “answers.” And
the problems are not limited to elementary and high school. For instance, one
concern of mine is the increasing emphasis on grants in higher education.
If we are not careful, winning grants
will become an end in itself rather than
a means to accomplishing something
worthwhile. That is just one threat that
I see in a general move toward a corporate model of higher education.
Conclusion: Reasons for
Optimism?
To avoid a pessimistic conclusion, I
will step out of character and conclude
by proposing that we have reasons for
optimism. I may be wrong about all of
this. If so, I nevertheless hope to have
presented issues worth thinking about.
A philosophy professor of mine once

described Bertrand Russell as one of
the great philosophers of the 20th century, then added that it was too bad he
had been wrong about nearly everything. I am not comparing myself to
Bertrand Russell. But research that is
wrong in its conclusions may still lead
to progress.
On the other hand, even if I am
right, there is reason for optimism
when we remember the extraordinary
things that people have done to challenge the status quo and make life better for their fellow human beings—
people like Mahatma Gandhi, Martin
Luther King Jr., Mother Teresa, Desmond Tutu, and Martha Stewart.
Well, maybe not Martha Stewart. And
in education we have people such
as Deborah Meier (1995), who have
done remarkable things to show how
schooling can be guided genuinely
and successfully by an explicit ethical
conception of what is good.
But remember, too, that good
things need not be extraordinary. It is
in the power of every researcher and
educator to do something to improve
the lives of people. Progress is not always easy, of course. It requires understanding, commitment, compassion, patience, and likely some amount
of courage.
As education researchers, we have
a particular obligation and opportunity to take a leading role in seeing
that the research that is done is truly
good research. As we do our work,
we need to think beyond questions of
how we will study students or analyze school policies: We need to think
about how we can make life better for
people. We need to think beyond our
taken-for-granted ideas of well-being and what is good and make those
ideas the objects of serious, communal
inquiry. Serving people’s well-being
is a great challenge, but it is also our
greatest calling.
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